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ABSTRACT 
National immigration policies increasingly meet with fierce political resistance from 
lower levels of government, in particular municipalities. Amongst industrialized 
countries, the USA and Germany are probably the most extreme examples. In the USA, 
a growing numbers of subnational entities, including some of the country’s largest cities, 
openly refuse to cooperate with federal immigration authorities. In retaliation, the Trump 
administrations has threatened several of these so-called ‘sanctuary cities’ to claim back 
past and to withdraw further federal funding from a number of jointly funded programs. 
Several court cases in this matter are pending. In stark contrast, an increasing number of 
German municipalities – labelled by the author as ‘non-sanctuary cities’ - have sought 
from their respective state governments a formal limitation of migration inflows into their 
territory, citing an overload on critical local administrative and not least housing 
resources. This paper contributes to the pertinent literature on multi-level governance in 
the area of immigration, first, by applying the economic theory of fiscal federalism to 
identify the theoretically appropriate level of government for defining and enforcing 
immigration policy. Second, the phenomenon of ‘sanctuary cities’ vs. ‘non-sanctuary 
cities’ and their potential impact on the design and enforcement of national immigration 
policies will be analyzed.  
 
Keywords: Immigration policy; refugee crisis, multi-level governance. 
 
Received 14 March 2018 | Revised 6 September 2018 | Accepted 10 December 2018. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
National immigration policies increasingly meet with fierce political resistance from 
lower levels of government, in particular municipalities, in the case of illegal or refugee 
immigration. Amongst industrialized countries, the USA and Germany are probably the 
most extreme examples. As for the USA, a growing around three hundred subnational 
entities, including some of the country’s largest cities, openly refuse to cooperate with 
the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) or by disallowing local police and 
civil servants officers to assist ICE staff. In retaliation, the Trump administrations has 
threatened several of these so-called ‘sanctuary cities’ to claim back past and to withdraw 
future federal funding from a number of jointly funded programs. Several court cases in 
this matter are pending.  
In stark contrast, an increasing number of German municipalities – labelled by the author 
as ‘non-sanctuary cities’ - have sought from their respective state governments a formal 
suspension of migration inflows into their jurisdictions, citing an overload on critical local 
Review of Integrative Business and Economics Research, Vol. 9, Issue 1 83 
 
Copyright  2020 GMP Press and Printing 
ISSN: 2304-1013 (Online); 2304-1269 (CDROM); 2414-6722 (Print) 
administrative and not least housing and security resources. This is due to the fact that - 
since the beginning of the so-called refugee crisis (aka migration crisis) in September 
2015 -, all asylum seekers are distributed throughout Germany by means of an inflexible 
quota system according to the so-called Königstein Formula (Königsteiner Schlüssel); it 
was originally designed to determine each German state’s share in the funding of joint 
federal-state activities. Based on their respective quota allocations, the states, in turn, 
reallocate their share of incoming asylum seekers to their own countries and 
municipalities.  
This papers aims to contribute to the pertinent literature on multi-level governance in the 
area of immigration, first, by applying the economic theory of fiscal federalism to identify 
the theoretically appropriate level of government for the definition and the enforcement 
of immigration policy. Second, the phenomenon of ‘sanctuary cities’ vs. ‘non-sanctuary 
cities’ and their potential impact on the effectiveness of national immigration policies will 
be assessed. This analysis will embrace the substantially different legal, institutional and 
not least fiscal constraints subnational entities are subject to in either country with respect 
to them having to cope with often increasing numbers of illegal immigrants and refugees 
and other types of asylum seekers. 
 
2. THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVES: PUSH AND PULL FACTORS AS 
MIGRATION DETERMINANTS 
Economic explanations of human behaviour generally assume rationality in the sense that 
individuals will always attempt to improve their utility – i.e. their material and immaterial 
welfare (optimal satisfaction) – by pursuing the best available options to achieve their 
goals under the given circumstances. In the context of migration decisions, these very 
circumstances are typically created by a mix of push and pull factors, i.e. temporary or 
permanent attractors (to other locations) and repellers (from the current location). 
Accordingly, push factors of migration are all utility-reducing factors which are specific 
to the place of residence of the individual and which the potential migrant is unable to 
change at reasonable cost or in a reasonable amount of time by means of the “voice” 
mechanism in the terminology of Hirschman (1970). Assuming that the (historically 
sunk) costs of maintaining the current place of residence plus the costs of emigrating to 
an alternative place of residence are lower than the (expected) benefits of leaving, the 
rational choice in this scenario would be to exit. This individual calculation applies 
indiscriminately to both legal and illegal migration. 
The principal push factors identified by economic and non-economic migration theories 
alike range from adverse political situations (including unrest, civil war and terrorism), 
personal persecution on political, racial, religious grounds, war, overpopulation and the 
resulting persistently unfavourable labour market conditions (which are often reinforced 
by favouritism and youth bulge effects), inexistent, insufficient or ineffective welfare 
provision, to severe environmental degradation (e.g. natural disasters, negative local 
effects of global climate change), but also the wish to support family members and relives 
at home with remittances (Nuwati/Apsari/Santoso 2018). 
By contrast, pull factors are all characteristics and living conditions of an alternative place 
of residence which are expected by a potential migrant to be more personally favourable 
than the corresponding living conditions in his current location. Push factors accordingly 
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include better labour market conditions including higher wage levels, better welfare 
benefits, legal and de facto protection for personal persecution on political, racial, 
religious grounds, and political and societal stability. 
To summarize, economic theory assumes that, from the perspective of the (potential) 
migrant, migration decisions – both with respect to internal and cross-border migration - 
are rational choices based on (real or perceived) arbitrage opportunities.  
In reality, however, individual migration plans often are not compatible with the 
immigration policies of the migrants’ preferred destinations. In reality, openness to 
immigration as well as immigration laws and policies fundamentally differ across 
countries. According to the most recent UN data (United Nations 2015), the developed 
countries as a group had a substantially higher share of immigrant populations (defined 
as foreign-born residents) at 11.7 per cent (up from 7.2 per cent in 1990) while for the 
developing countries their share had remained constant at 1.7 per cent. Country-specific 
variations are substantial, however, with the Holy See being populated 100 per cent by 
immigrations (1990: 100 per cent). Among the richest countries worldwide, the UAE has 
seen the foreign-born population increase to 88.4 per cent (1990: 72.1), Singapore to 45.5 
per cent (1990: 24.1 per cent), Hong Kong to 38.9 per cent (1990: 38.1. per cent), 
Australia to 28.2 (1990: 23.1) and Switzerland to 29.4 per cent (1990: 20.4 per cent). By 
contrast, China’s immigrant share has remained constant at 0.1 per cent while Japan’s 
went up to 1.6 per cent (1990: 0.9 per cent). As for the two geographical areas which are 
covered by this paper, the USA’s foreign-born population share has gone up to 14.5 per 
cent (1990: 9.2 per cent) while the EU member states’ shares deviate substantially. E.g. 
Sweden recorded an increase to 16.8 per cent (1990: 9.2 per cent), France to 12.1 per cent 
(1990: 10.4 per cent), Denmark to 10.1 per cent (1990: 4.6 per cent), the Netherlands to 
11.7 per cent (1990: 7.9 per cent) and Germany to 14.9 per cent (1990: 7.5 per cent). In 
the Eastern European part of the EU, Hungary observed an increase to 4.4 per cent (1990: 
3.3 per cent), while Poland – the most populated Eastern member of the EU and its fifth 
most-populated one (on par with Spain) saw a decline to 1.7 per cent (1990: 3.0 per cent). 
Obviously, the previous figures only represent the respective total stock of foreign-born 
residents according to the UN’s definition but ignore net flows. Moreover, they cover 
neither illegal immigrants nor naturalized second- and third-generation immigrants. More 
importantly, the data do not distinguish either between different migrant types as both 
emigrants and immigrants leave their former places of residence for a variety of reasons. 
The distinction of migration motives is, however, crucial to understand national migration 
policies (and their striking differences with respect to opportunities to obtain the status of 
a legal immigrant or refugee status).  
 
3. DIFFERENT (ECONOMIC) TYPES OF (CROSS-BORDER) MIGRATION 
In the pertinent literature, economic and otherwise, migration is frequently categorized 
along three basic dimensions: 
• Legal versus illegal migration (the latter variant includes visa overstays but also those 
immigrants whose have unsuccessfully sought to obtain legal status or who have seen 
their legal status revoked but are nevertheless ‘tolerated’, i.e. not deported to their 
home countries);  
• voluntary versus forced migration (the latter variant includes, i.a., slavery as well as 
personal persecution, civil war, war and victims of natural disasters); 
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• Temporary versus permanent migration (the latter may include the future obtainment 
of a permanent resident permit or may even result in the migrant becoming 
naturalized). 
Based on the aforementioned push and pull factors - which apply to internal and cross-
border migration alike -, an economic classification of migrant types should focus on the 
specific motives of individual migrants: 
• Labour migrants actively seek employment in a different place of residence; 
• migrants which seek access to more comprehensive welfare state benefits without 
intending or being qualified to integrate themselves into their destination’s workforce; 
• asylum seekers are those individuals who will (likely) be persecuted by state actors 
in their home countries and suffer grave human rights violations on grounds of their 
race, caste, nationality, religion, political opinions or their membership and/or 
participation in any particular social group or social activities; 
• refugees attempt to escape existential distresses in their home countries in the form of 
war (including civil war), natural disasters, widespread poverty and an general lack 
of economic prospects; 
• individuals with subsidiary protection status are those who are denied the legal status 
of a refugee or a political asylee but are able to demonstrate that they may suffer 
serious harm when forced to return to their home countries (e.g. due to the risk of 
torture or death penalty); 
• individuals seeking family reunifications. 
 
4. THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 
It is noteworthy in this context that the aforementioned terminology is not applied 
universally, nor is it codified uniformly in national and international immigration law. 
For example, German immigration rules do draw a very clear – though not necessarily 
economically rational - distinction between labour migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. 
In stark contrast, the United Nation’s Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (aka 
1951 Refugee Convention) defines a refugee much more broadly as any person who,  
 
“owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having 
a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, 
is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”1 
 
In other words, the UN Convention’s refugee definition does not only also include 
persecution by non-state actors; it even stipulates that the existence of a mere persecution 
risk invokes a legal entitlement to refugee status. 
For all the aforementioned migrant types, national migration laws of the USA and EU 
member states differ strongly. While the USA boasts a unified system of immigration law 
at the federal level – although its enforcement varies locally, especially in ‘sanctuary 
cities’ – and a much more integrated system of welfare benefits), the current immigration 
                                               
1  Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention (as amended by the 1967 Protocol)(http://www.unhcr. 
 org/3b66c2aa10)    
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regimes is substantially more complex in the EU and its member states, for the following 
four reasons: 
• First, it is important to distinguish between the pertinent rules for intra-EU migration 
of EU citizens (including from/to the member states of the European Economic Area 
(EEA) - Liechtenstein, Norway, Iceland – and Switzerland) and immigration from 
third countries into the EU. Intra-EU migration is indeed guaranteed by the Treaty 
provisions but limited to workers, self-employed service providers and those who 
migrate with the aim of actively seeking employment in another EU member state 
(valid for six months after their entry). All other EU citizens must produce evidence 
of sufficient financial means and a valid health insurance to obtain a residence permit 
in another member state if they intend to stay longer than three months.2  
• Second, intra-EU rules for acknowledging foreign qualifications are still not fully 
harmonized for a number of professional qualifications as most member states 
continue to regulate access to certain professions. With respect to labour immigrants 
from third countries, individual member states have set up their own rules and 
standards for the recognition of foreign qualifications.3 Furthermore, if the 
qualification levels are comparable, most EU member states still require that 
unemployed citizens of the member states must be given preference by private sector 
and public sector employer over immigrants from third countries.  
• Third, welfare state benefits in member states are not harmonized but instead reflect 
very different philosophies with respect to the responsibilities of the individual and 
the state when it comes to protect the individual from grave existential risks 
(unemployment, retirement, chronic illnesses, nursing cases etc.) as well as the 
income gaps between richer and poorer member states. Inevitably, eligibility criteria 
and welfare benefit vary massively among member states, thus giving rise to 
opportunities for arbitrage (‘welfare shopping’). 
• Fourth, asylum seekers and refugees face a very complex mix of often contradictory 
national rules, partly harmonized European law – the Common European Asylum 
System (GEAS)4 -, and international law – essentially the 1951 UN Refugee Con-
                                               
2  In Germany, the pertinent EU‘ Citizens’ Rights Directive 2004/38/EC ("Free Movement Direc-
tive") was transposed into German law through the Gesetz über die allgemeine Freizügigkeit von 
Unionsbürgern – Freizügigkeitsgesetz/EU of 2005. - Being an EU directive, member states enjoy 
substantial leeway in how to implement it to achieve the directive’s policy objectives. 
3  Even the EU’S Blue Card regime for highly qualified immigrants from third countries explicitly 
acknowledges the legal precedence over member states‘ national rules. 
4  Which is primarily based upon five legal acts:  The Dublin III Regulation (Council Directive 
2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003) laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum 
seekers, the Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the 
qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons 
who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted, Directive 
2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common 
standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, 
Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on 
standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of 
international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary 
protection, and for the content of the protection granted, and Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the establishment of 'Eurodac' for the 
comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for 
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vention – which co-exist. E.g., under Article 16a of the German Basic Law (Grund-
gesetz), political asylum may only be granted to an individual who did not enter 
German territory via a “safe third country” – which include all other EU member 
states and any other “third state in which application of the Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees and of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms is assured.” The EU’s GEAS, under the Dublin III 
Regulation, further stipulates that the member states which was first reached by an 
asylum seeker or refugee is in charge of processing their applications; the aim of 
GEAS is both to define EU-wide minimum standards in terms of asylum application 
procedures and the treatment of asylum seeker and to take effective precautions 
against regulatory arbitrage in the form of ‘asylum shopping’. It is noteworthy in this 
context that, regardless of their different migration motives, asylum seekers, refugees 
and those seeking subsidiary protection have to undergo the same formal asylum 
recognition procedures in most EU member states (although Denmark has opted out 
of the 2004 Asylum Qualification Directive and therefore does not grant subsidiary 
protection. As regards the 2011 revision of this very directive, Denmark, the United 
Kingdom and Ireland decided to opt out). In reality, however, implementation of the 
GEAS differs strongly even across the adopting member states; most of all 
EURODAC, the harmonized fingerprint-based identification system for asylum 
seekers and refugees has not been effective in preventing a large number of 
individuals from not registering in the system but instead seeking asylum or refugee 
status under several aliases in different EU member states. 
 
5. FISCAL FEDERALISM AND IMMIGRATION POLICY 
The economic theory of fiscal federalism provides an analytical framework to determine 
the proper assignment of government policies – i.e. the optimum degree of centralisation 
and decentralisation in the provision of different public goods and public services - within 
a multi-level government system (Oates 1972 and 1999). It also offers theoretical 
guidance on the adequate funding scheme to finance their delivery. Essentially, it is an 
economic approach to operationalize the subsidiarity principle (which is a guiding 
principle of the EU’s multi-level governance system although it originally derives from 
the catholic social philosophy of the early 20th century).  
The main insight of the theory of fiscal federalism is that, in a multi-level governance 
system, the most decentralized provision of public goods and services possible - in the 
sense that costs and benefits spatially overlap -, tends also to be the most economically 
efficient  assignment (and the most democratic, too).  
An important element of the theory of fiscal federalism therefore is the principle of fiscal 
equivalence (aka connexity principle in German public law) (Olson 1969). It claims that 
those citizens who decide about and have to fund a certain government policy should its 
only or at least principal beneficiaries. However, in the real world, jurisdictional 
boundaries and the spatial impact of policies do not always overlap but give rise to spill-
overs, i.e. positive or negative externalities, which convey economic benefits to or impose 
                                               
examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a 
third-country national or a stateless person and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data 
by Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes, and 
amending Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 establishing a European Agency for the operational 
management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice. 
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economic costs upon other jurisdictions which were not involved in the decision-making 
process.  
To internalise those spill-overs – at least those of great magnitude -, the theory of fiscal 
federalism, in its traditional variety, proposes centralisation as the economically efficient 
approach. Accordingly, all macroeconomic stabilisation policies as well as redistributive 
policies should be assigned to the highest level of government: The former because the 
multiplier and accelerator effects of macroeconomic policies cannot be contained within 
economically open lower level jurisdictions; the latter because the assumed high mobility 
of low income households - who are the (potential beneficiaries) of local or state welfare 
programs - might result in a massive influx of needy persons while richer households will 
attempt to escape the rising local tax burdens which may be required to finance those very 
benefits. This issue notwithstanding, a more progressive strand of the theory of fiscal 
federalism sees leeway for limited local/state experimentation with decentralised welfare 
policies: Laboratory federalism. Under this concept which assumes learning processes 
among the jurisdictions will take place, decentralized experimentation with innovative 
approaches to social policy may be tested at low cost and on a limited geographic scale 
and may eventually result in more effective and efficient centralised welfare policies.  
 
6. ‘SANCTUARY’ CITIES IN THE USA VS. ‘NON-SANCTUARY CITIES’IN 
GERMANY 
Conflicts with respect to the ensuring the lower level implementation of federal policies 
and laws are no rare phenomenon in multi-level governance structures. In case of the 
USA, examples include the federal government’s exclusive competence to negotiate and 
to adopt international trade agreements whose provisions may partly run afoul of state 
regulations (in the EU, the CETA Agreement between the EU and Canada also had to be 
ratified in Belgium by regional/state parliament). Another example was the recent conflict 
over transgender toilet access when a legal guideline issued by the Obama administration 
– which, although not legally binding, threatened states who would not comply with 
losing federal grants – was met with fierce resistance by some US states.5  
In Germany, due with its different multi-level governance structure which constitu-
tionally knows only few exclusive policy competences which are assigned to a specific 
government level. By contrast, many policy competences are defined as joint or shared, 
so implementation of federal policies and enforcement of federal laws is routinely and 
frequently contracted out to individual states. Based on their respective governments’ 
political preferences and due to the economic (dis)incentives states may face in the case 
of full compliance with federal laws and regulations, implementation and enforcement 
levels vary considerably among German states. The two most prominent areas in this 
context are, on the one hand, tax collection (due to massive economic disincentives under 
Germany’s fiscal federalism, in particular with respect to the current fiscal equalization 
scheme). On the other hand, this is clearly observable – measured by the respective 
success rates by nationality or ethnicity - as regards the application of federal immigration 
rules for asylum seekers, refugees, individuals who apply for subsidiary protection, and 
the probability of getting deported in the case of illegal aliens. 
 
 
 
                                               
5  For details and a chronology of events see The New York Times Online Edition (2017).  
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6.1 IMMIGRATION POLICY OF THE USA 
The USA is arguably the world’s largest “immigrant nation”. In modern times,6 i.e. since 
around 200 years, European immigrants formed the largest immigrant cohorts to North 
America - on economic, political and religious grounds alike. Nowadays the largest 
immigrant groups to the USA stem from Central and Latin America as well as Asia. 
Descendants of earlier immigrant generations, however, were frequently hostile towards 
later arrivals, especially towards those from different geographic regions and/or 
ethnicities, in particular during war periods such as World War II, when many Japanese 
Americans were imprisoned in camps, and after the 9/11 attacks, when this hostility was 
primarily directed at immigrants from Arabic countries specifically and at Muslim 
immigrants more generally.  
Throughout US history, immigration law were numerous times amended, and often 
tightened in the process, to restrict inflows from specific geographical areas and from 
select ethnicities. E.g., the Immigration Act of 1924 established a legal cap of 150,000 
legal immigrants per year which was disaggregated into a nation-based quota systems 
which reflected the composition of the US population of that time (Bös 1997). In 1965, 
the quota system was again abolished, and visa applications were processed on a first 
come, first served basis until the cap was exhausted.  
Under the Reagan administration, the existing immigration system gradually became a 
national security concern due to the high numbers of illegal immigrants, especially from 
Central America. In reaction, employers of illegal aliens were threatened with penal 
sanctions, border control was reinforced, but also qualifying illegal aliens were repeatedly 
granted amnesties, and a special programme for easier access to temporary legal employ-
ment for immigrants in agriculture was passed by Congress.  
In 1990, additional measures to regulate immigration were adopted. In particular, 
immigration of qualified foreigners was promoted. Moreover, the cap was increased to 
675,000 individuals per year; it included 480,000 permits for family reunification, 
140,000 work visas and 55,000 Green Cards which were assigned by the Green Card 
lottery.  
After 9/11, several initiatives to fundamentally reform immigration laws and to improve 
their enforcement were launched by the Bush Administration – with the aim to ease 
deportations - and the Obama Administrations – with the aim to facilitate the attainment 
of legal status for children of illegal immigrants who had obtained an education in the 
USA (the so-called ‘Dreamers’ initiative); they were met with mixed success in the 
political process, however, an remained politically controversial. Finally, the Trump 
Administration’s main election promises in the field of immigration policy were to 
massively reduce illegal immigration into the USA through the US-Mexican border 
(‘Build the wall’), to deport, on a large scale, illegal aliens, and to restrict immigration 
from countries who were not cooperating in the visa process (mostly, but not exclusively 
countries with a Muslim population majority, hence the grossly misleading term ‘Muslim 
ban’ which was coined by some media outlets). Apart from labour market concerns over 
negative wage impacts of illegal immigration, security concerns are the main guiding 
principles behind these policy changes according to the Trump Administration (however, 
                                               
6  Obviously, the first immigrant to the lands which later become the USA, reached the North 
American continent around 10,000 to 30,000 years ago during several ice ages which allowed 
them to cross the Bering Strait on foot. They were later named ‘Indians‘ by European discoverers, 
missionaries and settlers. 
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it is noteworthy in this context that the deportation targets announced by the Trump Ad-
ministration essentially reflect the actual deportation rates achieved under the Obama 
Administration during its second term on office). 
Currently (based on 2016 figures which include both new arrivals and extension of 
existing legal immigrant status), family-sponsored immigrants represent 68.0 per cent of 
all legal immigrants into the USA, compared to 11.7 per cent on work permits and 13.3 
per cent who entered as asylees and refugees (all remaining legal immigrants are covered 
by other categories such as diversity programmes) (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security 2017). 
 
6.2 ‘SANCTUARY CITIES’ 
The ‘sanctuary cities’ movement has its roots in faith-based and religious groups – 
essentially Christian and Jewish – who refer provisions of the Old Testament.7 8 Despite 
the illegality of its actions under US Federal laws, after the enactment of the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 by the Clinton 
Administration9 and, most of all, in the aftermath of 9/11, the movement was embraced 
and endorsed by a number of university cities such as Berkeley (which as early as 1971 
had passed a city resolution to the same effect), civil rights activists, immigration lawyers 
and even some US states.  
While Madison, WI, is widely perceived to be the first ‘sanctuary city’ in the USA. In 
June 1983, its city council passed legislation which encourages local churches to provide 
shelter for illegal immigrants from Central America from deportation, so far, around three 
hundred US cities in all of the most populated states with the exception of Texas have 
followed suit by passing local laws to similar effect.10 These approximately three hundred 
cities represent slightly more than fifty per cent of the total US population The 
Washington Times 2018). 
The majority of the pertinent local laws ban local officials - and in some case also local 
businesses - from cooperating with the Federal US Immigration and Customs Enforce-
ment (ICE) officer by not holding suspected illegal aliens for ICE interrogations or by 
disallowing local police officers to assist ICE staff. In retaliation, the Trump ad-
ministrations has threatened several ‘sanctuary cities’ (most of which are political 
strongholds of the Democratic Party) to claim back past and to withdraw further federal 
funding from a number of jointly funded programs. Several court cases in this matter are 
currently pending. 
 
 
 
                                               
7  See, for details, Gonzalez/Collingwood/Omar El-Khatib et.al. (2017); Martinelli (2017); Center 
for Popular Democracy/Local Progress (2017). 
8  In the Old Testament, Moses demanded that Israelites provide six cities of refuge for perpetrators 
of accidental manslaughter where they were secure from bloody revenge which was legal outside 
their boundaries. 
9  The Clinton Administration’s Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996 was a legal document which aimed at clarifying the relationship between the federal 
government and local governments in immigration law enforcement. Its provisions also rendered 
some minor crimes, e.g. shoplifting, into legally acceptable grounds for deportation and removed 
some the previous ban some ‘sanctuary cites’ had imposed on municipal employees to provide 
information on the immigration status of clients to federal authorities. 
10  For a complete list see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sanctuary_city. 
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6.3 IMMIGRATION POLICY OF GERMANY 
Immediately after World War II, both East and West Germany faced their first major 
immigration crisis when around 15 million German refugees and expellees fled their 
former homes throughout the Eastern territories of the Reich which were lost in the wake 
of the war in order to flee persecution or discrimination in return for the atrocities which 
were committed during the war by Germany in these very areas. With both West Germany 
and East Germany massively destroyed and employment opportunities and housing in 
very scarce supply, the post-war reconstruction boom quickly defused the situation. 
In fact, when full employment was attained from the late 1950ies in West Germany, the 
decision was made to admit, on a temporary basis, migrant workers from a number of 
lower income Mediterranean countries (Seifert 2012). The legal basis were the so-called 
labour recruitment agreements, the first of which was concluded with Italy in 1955, 
followed by similar agreements with Spain and Greece in 1960, Turkey in 1961 (which 
was included at the specific request of the US government due to geopolitical and military 
considerations), Morocco in 1963, Portugal in 1964, Tunisia in 1965 and Yugoslavia in 
1967 to help fill the growing number of vacancies for low-skilled blue-collar jobs in 
manufacturing and mining.  
Before the closure of the East German-West German border on August 13th, 1961, the 
day the Wall was built, however, the influx of foreign labour immigrants these countries 
war quantitatively insignificant (between 1949 and the August 13th, 1961, East Germany 
lost around four million inhabitants and an estimated share of 10-15 per cent of its 
workforce to West Germany on political and economic grounds). Before, in the aftermath 
of the 1973 oil crisis, a general recruitment ban for these so-called ‘guest workers’ was 
imposed by the federal government, four million labour immigrants from the 
aforementioned countries had entered the German labour market. Following the 
recruitment ban, the number of ‘guest workers’ who returned to their home countries was 
essentially matched by those immigrants who decided to stay (as they remained on valid 
labour contracts) who sought and obtained the right to family reunification. 
The next immigration wave was caused by refugees from the civil wars in Yugoslavia – 
the vast majority of whom had to return home after the end of the conflict - and the 
Turkish-Kurdish conflict and began in 1991. This wave was even surpassed with respect 
to the sheer numbers of immigrants by another wave of immigration from ethnic German 
resettlers (‘Aussiedler’ and ’Spätaussiedler’) (and their family members) from the Eastern 
Territories of the Reich after the collapse of the communist bloc. Legally based on the 
Federal Law on Refugees and Exiles of 1953, this group of immigrants was assured the 
same legal privileges and welfare benefits as the German expellees and refugees after 
World War II; they also were eligible, additionally, to a quasi-automatic access to the 
German citizenship (including generous hereditary rights to the German citizenship for 
their descendants and their close non-German relatives).  
Finally, the ongoing ‘refugee crisis’ primarily in the wake of the civil war in Syria and 
the regime change Libya (brought about by France, the UK and the USA), the Arab Spring 
events in North Africa and regional unrest in parts of Afghanistan and the Sahel has had 
Germany and many other EU member states face an inflow of overwhelmingly low-
skilled, Muslim immigrants from economically underdeveloped countries at historically 
unprecedented levels. In 2015, around 900,000 real (and fake) refugees entered Germany, 
often under chaotic circumstances; by 2017, the number of asylum applications in the 
wake of the ‘refugee crisis’ has stabilized at 649,855 for all EU member states. 
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Alongside the massive challenges the EU is currently facing from the unresolved Euro 
crisis and the Brexit vote, the refugee crisis has not only created (or just revealed?) strong 
political rifts among EU member states on the proper handling of the current refugee 
intake in adequate fiscal and humanitarian solidarity among member states. With the 
refugee crisis having also laid bare substantial design flaws in the GEAS, it has also 
ushered in a divisive debate on the future direction and conduct of immigration policy in 
the EU.  
  
6.4 ‘NON-SANCTUARY CITIES’ 
While the ‘sanctuary cities’ movement is gradually emerging also in Europe and Germany 
(Heuser 2017) - often under the ‘solidarity city’ label,11 which is, in turn, an element of 
the ‘open borders movement’ – the more frequent phenomenon is the increasing number 
of ‘non-sanctuary cities’. Although the term is not (yet) commonly used in the academic, 
media and political circles of Germany, it refers to those municipalities which seek a legal 
exemption from their respective state government with respect to the number of refugees 
they must legally accommodate until the completion of their application process for 
asylum.  
To further explore the ‘non-sanctuary cities’ phenomenon, a closer look the formal 
procedures of handling incoming refugees is indispensable. To start with, individuals 
seeking asylum or refugee status under German and/or EU law must report to a border 
control post or at another state authority (e.g. police posts, refugee reception centers etc.) 
immediately after reaching German territory. Afterwards they will be sent to regional 
registration centers if they seek asylum in German. During this procedure, fingerprints 
and photographs are taken from anyone older (or claiming to be older) than 14 years 
(around 90 per cent of refugees who have entered Germany do not present IDs from their 
home countries which would prove their age and nationality). These data will then be 
shared with all involved government agencies in Germany and, via the Eurodac system, 
the other EU and EEA member states.  
Asylum seekers then receive a proof of arrival card – which confers upon them a legal 
claim to numerous welfare benefits – and will be transferred (or transfer themselves) to 
their assigned reception centers. During the application process, asylum seekers refugees 
are on the one hand subject to a residence obligation (which it is de facto not strictly 
enforced) to prevent them from ‘asylum shopping’ or going underground. On the other 
hand, they are, however, eligible for a variety of monetary and non-monetary welfare 
benefits, including pocket money (€139 per month for single adults, €129 per person in 
couples; the allowances for children are age-related and range from €84 to €95 per 
month), plus free accommodation in a reception center and free food. If and once the 
asylum applicants has been transferred to housing outside the reception centers, an extra 
allowance is granted to cover extra expenses such as clothing, food, rent, heating, 
household items and furniture (singles: €219/month; couples: €194 per person and month; 
children: €133 up to €198 per child and month).  
To share the financial burden to host asylum seekers fairly among the sixteen German 
states, their primary allocation is based on the so-called ‘Königsteiner Schlüssel’, a quota 
system which was originally developed to calculate the contribution of individual states 
in funding joint federal-state projects (e.g. infrastructures). A state’s share is calculated 
by multiplying the tax revenues it generates (weight: 2/3) with its population (weight: 
                                               
11  See https://solidarity-city.eu/de/.  
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1/3). Since the reform of September 24th, 2015, a substantial part of the funding has been 
shared between the Federal government and the respective state government.  
While German counties (‘Landkreise’) and municipalities are largely compensated for 
the services they provide to asylum seekers – essentially housing and child support - from 
their state governments (Hummel/Thöne 2016) -, this compensation only partly covers 
resources with are tied up in the processing of refugees and asylum seekers. Typically, 
the influx of assigned refugees puts severe strains not only on existing administrative 
infrastructures – which have found it difficult to add qualified extra staff (except for some 
pensioners and volunteers) for lack of adequate funding to accommodate the additional 
workload without compromising on the needs of local residents and on the quality of 
service delivery. Moreover, physical infrastructures like housing and schools cannot be 
quickly extended capacity-wise. Finally, intercultural clashes between refugees and locals 
have become everyday occurrences throughout the country and are reflected in the strong 
increase in crime rates among refugees as well as in the increase of anti-refugee crimes 
in the 2017 criminal statistic of Germany (Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und 
Heimat 2018a and 2018b).  
Meanwhile, five municipalities have requested a temporary suspension from their 
respective state governments (‘Zuzugssperre’) of their obligation to accommodate 
additional refugees locally: Salzgitter, Delmenhorst and Wilhelmshaven in Lower 
Saxony, Pirmasens in Rhineland-Palatinate and Freiberg in Saxony. A substantial 
increase in the number of ‘non-sanctuary cities’ is widely expected as it is strongly 
supported by the German Association of Cities (‘Deutscher Städtetag’).  
 
7. ASSESSMENT 
It is now time to address the research question: To which level of government should 
immigration policies be assigned? The preliminaries of the previous chapters have 
produced the insight that the economically optimum solution - according to the principles 
developed by the theory of fiscal federalism - should be very different for the USA and 
the EU. First, The USA is a time-tested political entity with strong legal and political 
institutions and a clear delineation of the respective policy competences and funding 
sources of all levels and government. This also applies to both of the two most crucial 
policy areas with respect to immigration: Immigration laws and the legal rules which 
determine eligibility for and access to welfare benefits. To be more specific, federal and 
state rules generally exclude illegal immigrants from state and municipal welfare benefits 
for fife years (except for short-term emergency health care, disaster relief and vaccination 
programs; moreover, if female illegal immigrants to the USA give birth to a child on USA 
soil, the child is considered a US citizens and fully eligible for US welfare benefits, and 
so are his parents despite their illegal alien status): However, fraud does occur as local 
civil servants frequently are not adequately trained and equipped to identify the true legal 
status of an immigrant beyond doubt – an enforcement problem which is reinforced by 
the unwillingness of ‘sanctuary cities’ to cooperate with federal agencies in this matter. 
By contrast, and despite of all its comprehensive harmonisation efforts so far, the EU is 
nowhere close to being a true nation-state or some other form of fully integrated political 
and economic entity; nor is likely to evolve into one due to the very distinct cultural, 
linguistic and historical heritage of its 28 member states, their substantial differences in 
terms of economic performance (and hence per capita income and wealth levels) and with 
respect to the breadth and depth of their respective welfare states. In this setting, plenty 
of opportunities for arbitrage (e.g. in the form of ‘asylum shopping’) and beggar-my-
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neighbour policies by individual member states to the economic and political detriment 
of others remain. As was discussed in more detail before, the ongoing refugee crisis 
provides ample evidence for the practical relevance of this theoretical observation. Even 
when one assumes (despite strong evidence to the contrary) that all recent arrival were 
indeed refugees and asylum seekers in the meaning of pertinent national, EU, and inter-
national laws, all of them were safe from the persecution they had endured as soon as 
they had entered whichever EU member state. However, due to a combination of 
differences with respect to the magnitude of crucial pull factors and the wish of some 
member states to avoid the fiscal strains and potential for intercultural conflicts which is 
inextricably linked to hosting a large number of refugees in a very short time, a substantial 
number of refugees decided to move on: Towards those EU member states with the com-
paratively highest welfare benefits (which differ substantially amongst member states), 
and/or the best job market prospects and/or the lowest deportation rates (i.e. Germany and 
Sweden).  
Having said this, the current design of the USA’s immigration system comes rather close 
to the theoretical ideal of the theory of fiscal federalism, although enforcement issues 
including but not limited to the reluctance of ‘sanctuary cities’ to observe federal laws 
may have somewhat compromised its effectiveness. However, from the perspective of 
laboratory federalism, ‘sanctuary cities’ defiance may provide the scientific benefit of 
offering the opportunities to study empirically the labour market effects of illegal 
immigration as well as its contribution to regional economic growth and development in 
a differentiated way in controlled settings.  
As for the EU, however, the very opposite holds. Despite the quite far-reaching formal 
harmonization of immigration rules with respect to asylum seekers and refugees, the 
existing pull factors cannot be equalized due to the extreme economic, political and 
cultural diversity of member states – neither de jure nor de facto, and not even in the long 
run.  
From a fiscal federalism perspective this implies, as no centralization in this field would 
be economically sustainable (let alone politically achievable), individual EU member 
states, not the EU, should have full control over their respective immigration policies in 
general and their refugee intake in particular as they inevitable have to bear the largest 
share of the economic and social costs. Most likely, however, this assignment of policy 
competences appears impossible to implement within the existing Schengen framework 
and in the absence of an agreed upon system of fiscal transfers to benefit those member 
states who must bear the brunt of the costs of the refugee crisis – i.e. both those EU 
member states like Greece, Italy and, increasingly, Spain which have been the main 
gateways for refugees into the EU and those other EU member states which have become 
their preferred (final) destinations.   
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